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Abstract: This article briefly analyzes the implications of Lewis Gordon’s work on race, 
racism and disciplinarity in our field of inquiry, peace studies. The centrality of human beings 
and freedom in Gordon's philosophy, and his metadisciplinary reflections help us to rethink 
our experience as doctoral students in the discipline where questions of race, racism and 
colonialism are undertheorized. We contend that an interdisciplinary approach that leaves 
disciplines unquestioned is insufficient to address problems of racism. 
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Resumo: Este artigo analisa brevemente as implicações do trabalho de Lewis Gordon sobre 
raça, racismo e disciplinaridade em nosso campo de pesquisa, sobre estudos da paz. A 
centralidade dos seres humanos e da liberdade na filosofia de Gordon e suas reflexões 
metadisciplinares nos ajudam a repensar nossa experiência como doutorandos na disciplina 
onde as questões de raça, racismo e colonialismo são subabordadas. Afirmamos que uma 
abordagem interdisciplinar que deixa as disciplinas inquestionadas é insuficiente para 
disccutir os problemas gerados pelo racismo. 
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Nelson Maldonado-Torres defines Lewis Gordon as a philosopher of the human and 
points out how his study of race and racism “serves as an entry mode to theorize the human” 
(MALDONADO-TORRES, 2008, p.118). Gordon’s work on race illuminates the fact that race 
and racism are human phenomenon, which ultimately are human relations manifested. 
Understanding the construction of race as the product of meaning-constituting activities of 
humans resulting from the changes in human relations requires looking back at the year1492, 
which inaugurated the European encounter with the “New World.” This signaled new 
relations and categories for human groups that had not existed before. The etymology of race 
comes from raza in the fifteenth century Andalucia (NIRENBERG, 2012, p.102) to refer to 
breeds of animals, and Jews and Muslims. The word then already has its roots in the judgment 
of the normative humanity, which at the time was Christian, and later in secularization as 
science replaced religion, became European (read white) from the eighteenth century onward. 
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The problem of European Christians from their encounters with the peoples from the New 
World was that no description they knew of in their known world could describe these peoples. 
As seen in the famous debate between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepúlveda, 
placing the people outside the human category gave the Christians the license to enslave and 
annihilate entire populations of people. The Atlantic slave trade then gradually replaced the 
enslavement of the peoples of the New World. Africans, who, according to Fanon, never had 
to think of themselves as other than human beings became known as black in the Euro-
modern world. 
In Gordon’s Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism (1995), a relational and existential 
dimension of anti-black racism is explored by using the Sartrean concept of bad faith 
(mauvaise-foi). Bad faith here is used to evade the responsibility humans fundamentally have 
to relate to other human beings. Racism attempts to push human beings outside of human 
relations. A racist hides from the truth that he is in fact dealing with flesh and blood human 
beings instead of a category. In other words, the antiblack racist is lying to himself as he 
knows that blacks are humans but refuses to see it. To see human beings as categories such as 
“white” or “black” instead of people with different hues of skin color involves a form of bad 
faith. Bad faith, then, is an “essential attitude” for denying human reality. Reality, for Gordon, 
is the opposite of bad faith. Bad faith involves denying our relationship with and to reality. It 
denies the intersubjective world of each other, a world where human freedom is ultimately 
found. This is the world Frantz Fanon was referring to when he said “Was my freedom not 
given to me then to build the world of the You?” (FANON, 2008, p. 181) Racism, denying 
such freedom of oneself and other humans, according to Gordon, is a form of misanthropy. In 
this way, it is not the elimination of race that will rid ourselves of racism. Rather, it is the 
Gordonian understanding of the human as a free being in her relations with other human 
beings that makes racism flawed, as it is an effort to hide from one’s freedom. For Gordon, 
freedom is not just emancipation. It is also broader and more fundamental than liberation, 
justice, or peace. It is rooted in the human condition of individuals as openness, possibilities, 
and relationships that together construct meanings of the social world, the world of 
intersubjectivity.   
Gordon’s black existential philosophy, thus, is not only about theorizing the existence 
of black people, but concomitantly about what it means to be human. That is why his first 
philosophy is philosophical anthropology. From that question, other questions emerge. 
Gordon’s tracing of the black intellectual responses to the lived experience of African 
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diasporic people of enslavement, colonialism, and racism, thus, raises the three thematically 
interrelated issues: what it means to be human in interrogating the standards of humanity, 
practices of freedom, and metacritique of reason in questioning how the justification itself is 
justified. Rooted in a philosophy of existence and using an Africana phenomenological 
analysis, Gordon’s study of antiblack racism brings to the forefront, rather than hides from, 
the role of human agency and responsibility in an ongoing praxis of freedom as a meaning-
constituting activity in a world of relationships. The study of race and racism, then, becomes a 
significant point of departure from the colonial conception of the human and its 
methodological assumptions. Questioning race and racism ultimately leads to questioning the 
very method and discipline for studying the human. Gordon stresses the significance of 
Fanon’s work in decolonial thought precisely because it raises the problem of coloniality at 
the methodological level (GORDON, 2015). 
We, the authors, are currently doing a doctoral dissertation in peace studies where we 
undertook our research projects on race and racism. While peace studies’ interdisciplinarity 
allows us to borrow insights from other disciplines that sufficiently deal with these issues, we 
observe a lack of transdisciplinary effort across disciplines to discuss the problem of race and 
racism. The characteristics of an interdisciplinary approach sometimes maintain disciplines as 
isolated and unquestioned since no dialogue goes beyond a tangential relationship among 
disciplines, which will be discussed below. Although there have recently been examinations 
of how race lies at the core of human rights (SUAREZ-KRABBE, 2015), international law 
(ANGHIE, 2004) or international relations (ANIEVAS et al., 2014), in our program, neither 
race nor racism was part of the syllabus, and in other programs the topic is usually subsumed 
under ethnic and racial conflicts. The implications of racism, colonialism, and Eurocentrism 
are mentioned but not often talked about with full honesty and depth, leaving this task to the 
practitioners of other disciplines. In our classroom, racism was mentioned as a form of 
structural violence that can be explained according to certain scientific formula of race, 
gender, class, nation, etc. (GALTUNG, 1996). This approach to racism often creates a volatile 
situation in classroom situations. Different views on what racism is and what it is not would 
clash in discussions. “Gender” and “Race” would clash sometimes and some female students 
of color would hesitantly confess their disapproval of feminism, not realizing that their 
sentiment was actually against apparent racism in certain brands of feminist theories. In 
general, a great level of confusion would often emerge from the discussion around race. As 
the program hosted a number of students from across the world, some of the students came 
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from places where the term “race” was best avoided for its strong association with Nazism, 
while others had daily encounters of what “race” meant in their lived experience. The account 
of their lived experience as evidence of racism was either dismissed as an extraordinary 
situation or attributed to the manifestation of structural violence. How may one talk about race 
when the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
declared in 1950 in the wake of the Second World War that “race” should be considered a 
social myth as it has been found to be biologically untenable? 
The myth of 'race' has created an enormous amount of human and social damage. In 
recent years it has taken a heavy toll in human lives and caused untold suffering. It 
still prevents the normal development of millions of human beings and deprives 
civilization of the effective co-operation of productive minds. The biological 
differences between ethnic groups should be disregarded from the standpoint of 
social acceptance and social action. The unity of mankind from both the biological 
and social viewpoints is the main thing [UNESCO: Statement on Race by Social 
Scientists] (LAWSON, 1991, p. 1217) 
The social constructivity of race had to be accepted in order to promote unity, and 
since it was socially constructed and is biologically and genetically meaningless, it was not 
real. Students are often advised to use the inverted commas for writing about race to let the 
readers know that they do not believe it to be real. However, if it is not real, why would some 
of our classmates suffer the consequences of it in their everyday lives? Students are 
sometimes encouraged to believe what they do not believe. What happens when we say one 
thing, yet on the daily level we live evidence of its contradictions? Such evidence is often 
collapsed into “exceptions” (GORDON, 2006, p. 73) or removed from epistemology itself. 
According to Gordon, evidence is social, and ― because it is social ― it is “subject to the 
complex exchange of intersubjective activities” (Ibid., p. 29). For evidence to appear, it 
requires a world of others. Denying a critical relationship to evidence involves bad faith, thus 
a denial of reality. To assert that racism is a thing of a past, negates implications of coloniality 
in racism, dismisses it as an aberration of the norm, or puts the blame on the structure. These 
are all methods of rejecting the problem. Similarly, Gordon notes that 
A great deal of effort to study racism is marred by the core problem of self-evasion. 
This is partly because the study of racism is dirty business. It unveils things about 
ourselves that we may prefer not to know. If racism emerges out of an evasive spirit, 
it is hardly the case that it would stand still and permit itself to be unmasked. Race 
theorists theorize in a racist world. The degree to which that world is made evident 
will have an impact on the question of whether the theorist not only sees but also 
admits what is seen (1995, p. ix). 
The fundamental importance of Gordon’s approach to racism is that he is not afraid to 
put a human face on it. For Gordon, theorizing about human phenomena and the social world 
without the presence of the human risks naturalizing oppression. It is a form of bad faith, a lie 
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to the self and an escape from responsibility for the problem at hand and its solution, and 
flight from the social world. Since the social world is dependent on the agency and the 
generative activities of the individuals, forgetting such facts runs the risk of doing an 
“inhuman” study of human phenomena (GORDON, 2000, p. 155). Losing the social 
dimension of the structure leaves one paralyzed from acting. As Gordon says:  
Structures set the conditions for us, but do not determine what we will do and the 
meaning of our various projects in life. This is so by virtue of many of us doing 
different things and creating new forms of meaning in structurally similar, if not 
the same, circumstances. The human world is, in other words, lived, and it is 
creatively so. (GORDON, 2006, p. 18) 
The recognition of humanity in others involves, for Gordon (1995a), admission of the social 
dimensions of embodiment. This is related to questions of what it means to be human as 
openness and freedom. In Gordon’s existential phenomenological approach to the human as 
freedom in the flesh, both oppression and emancipation are not dissociated from the human 
body as an opening to the social world (2006, pp. 103-105). This manifests as the individual’s 
relation to structures with regard to choices and the options available. Options function as 
material reality. Oppression involves reducing or exhausting options available for a certain 
group of people. However, humans always have choices even after options run out. Those 
choices are directed inward to the self, to the point of extreme introspection.  This is an 
oppressive situation.  In Gordon’s view, the notion of power is in accordance with his 
emphasis on the agency and creativity of the human being and her capacity to affect the social 
world. In oppressive situations, the reach of the individual does not extend beyond her own 
body. Thus, violence hovers around. On the contrary, when options are available, the outward 
choices expand the reach of the body, thereby increasing its impact and reach on the social 
world. This is power, the expansion of the “the ability with the means to make things happen” 
(GORDON, 2017, p. 41). 
If bad faith is an attempt to flee from freedom and responsibility, a mature 
philosophical anthropology recognizes the complexity and contradictions of living in an adult 
world. In that world, innocence becomes irrelevant, for the actions required for emancipation 
imply facing the challenges and assuming the responsibilities that freedom entails, rather than 
hiding from them (GORDON, 1995a, p. 80). For Gordon, freedom is imbued in human 
conditions, the manifestation of which is a responsible adult relation with others. It is the 
basic condition for humans to cultivate a world of relationships where human beings can 
flourish. This should be distinguished from such freedom that a racist advocates as “freedom 
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of speech.” That is not freedom but, according to Gordon, a “license” to do whatever one 
wants to do, which strips one of maturity and responsibility and is thus childish. This is linked 
to another always implicit and sometimes explicit point in Gordon’s reading of the 
philosophical anthropology of the blues, of Fanon, of the liberation efforts of black people, of 
the theorist of human science, and of the educator:  the question of maturity. In this way, 
education fosters growth and maturation as maturity means to face reality and take 
responsibility for it. The decolonizing of classrooms then requires facing this reality, which 
means sometimes having to go beyond disciplinary boundaries and methodologies, 
particularly with regard to the study of the human. Taking that into consideration, peace 
theory and pedagogy need not leave the question of race to other disciplines. Thinking about 
race and racism is at the core of many subsequent questions that call for a new understanding 
of human beings and how to study them.  
Gordon conceives thought and disciplines as alive, a consequence of “the living reality 
on which they rest, namely living societies,” (GORDON, 2006, p. 8) and thus, exposed to the 
possibility of decline. At the outset, it must be underscored that Gordon’s conception of 
discipline is not a negative one. By way of John Dewey, Gordon retrieves how disciplines 
were initially based on a generative conception of power to construct and create knowledge 
rather than their current function in academia: as power to control and organize knowledge 
(Ibid., p. 4). It is when the discipline exerts closure on its own scope, when it is reified and 
replaces the world, that thinking decays, for thinking must be subordinated to reality: “[a] 
completely thinkable reality would not be reality any longer, but only an addendum to what is 
possible [in thought]” (Jaspers as quoted in GORDON, 2006, p. 46).  This view of thinking as 
preceding reality, makes it a humbling rather than a conquering activity: “to think, really to 
think, is to engage the frightening evidence of our own conceptual limitation and to realize, in 
such limits, the magnitude of all that transcends us” (Ibid., p. 33). The problem takes place 
when “disciplines lose sight of themselves as efforts to understand the world and have 
collapsed into the hubris of asserting themselves as the world” (p.8). 
In peace studies, peace is seen as the basis of human relations and violence the rupture 
of the norm (MARTINEZ-GUZMÁN, 2001). Hence, the attention dedicated to theorization of 
violence has been scant beyond the initial formulations of Johan Galtung addressed above. 
Some theorists point out the undertheorization or absence of violence in theories of peace 
(COURTHEYN, 2017). However, others show anxiety for the space that violence is dedicated 
to in the study of conflicts. Francisco Muñoz (2001), warns peace researchers against the 
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“excessive attention to violence” leading to “cognitive schizophrenia”.  In a similar vein, the 
editors of Geographies of Peace, argue that while the discipline has been “doing the important 
task of challenging the moral logic of war, it has failed to develop equally sophisticated 
theoretical engagements with, and devote sustained empirical research to, peace” 
(MCCONNELL et al 2014, p. 1). In their conclusion, they specify that, “to be against violence 
is not necessarily the same as being for peace” (MEGORAN et al, 2014, p. 256). Although we 
agree with that statement, the problem is that it actually functions as a call for purity, a narrow 
redefinition of the ethical and epistemic boundaries of the discipline, wherein peace is 
implicitly reduced to nonviolence (LOYD, 2015). 
At a break during a conference on decolonial thought, we approached a peace scholar:  
- “What are you working on?  
-“On Palestine and decolonization”.  
- “Are you using Fanon?” 
-“No, no” the scholar answered nervously, somewhat surprised. Later, during his 
conference he mentioned the “theories of Fanon,” probably meaning armed struggle, to refer 
to outdated approaches to decolonization in contrast to his Gandhian one. 
In another situation at a café having an informal chat with a peace philosopher: 
- Are you guys reading Fanon? I have not read him, but I have heard that he did not 
actually defend violence. 
There are several problems with this widespread understanding of the discipline. As 
Gordon points out, disciplinary decadence functions within and without knowledge 
distinctions; it delimitates a safe terrain and turns it into the world, thereby reducing the 
exposure of the theorist to questions that can lead her to the way out (Gordon, 2006: 23). The 
first problem of the call to study peace without violence is that it impedes research on forms 
of violence that are not accounted in official records for being considered exceptional. Police 
brutality is one such case, as denounced by both Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, and We 
Charge Genocide (LOYD, 2015). Another problem is whether such a disciplinary approach of 
reifying peace is actually in tune with the plight, the demands, and the objectives of oppressed 
people. In other words, by focusing on a narrow view of peace the theorist may demand the 
innocence and predetermine the conditions for action of oppressed groups. 
This is a common pattern in the treatment of nonviolence. A paradigmatic example is 
the important study carried out by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance 
Works, which documents the great deal of efficacy of nonviolent struggles in contrast to the 
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failures of violent approaches in the same situations. Success and failure are measured in 
terms of the political goals of the corresponding movements. What the authors miss is that in 
almost every instance there was the coexistence and almost a symbiotic relation between both 
strategies (WILLIAMS, 2010; COBB JR., 2014; SUTHERLAND and MEYER, 2000). A 
feature of disciplinary decadence, and the closed system that it fosters, is that it expels failure 
to the outside, leaving methods and disciplines not only unquestioned but also reinforced: 
That they were “disciplinary” stifled every question, subdued every doubt, and 
removed the subject from the realm of rational discussion. By its nature, the 
allegation could not be checked up. Even when discipline did not accrue as matter of 
fact, when the pupil even grew in laxity if application and lost power of intelligent 
self-direction, the fault lay with him, not with the duty or methods of teaching. 
(Dewey, as quoted in GORDON, 2006, p. 4) 
Gordon (2007) articulates in theological language this phenomenon of blaming the 
outsider, the student, the black, for the imperfections of the system. Theodicy is the question 
that arises from the presence of evil given the all-encompassing goodness of god. The answer 
is to reassert the perfection of god by putting the blame of evil on humans, either for their bad 
choices or for their lack of divine understanding. For Gordon, the grammar of theodicy 
remains in today’s secular systems. Whether political or epistemic, they replace god. If 
systems work in a theodicean way, that is, they are complete and just, then the problems and 
contradictions of the system are moved to the exterior. They are displaced as pathological 
deviances. These outsiders, rather than facing problems, become the problem themselves. For 
Gordon, drawing on W.E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon, the double position of black people 
as both outsiders and insiders carries with it the potential of a broader perspective, a critical 
dialectic relationship to society that unveils the contradictions of the system. 
The work of Frantz Fanon, as a psychiatrist and social theorist, reveals how taking 
race into consideration in the human sciences does not simply function as another substantive 
category to be added to the discipline through osmosis; rather it requires a change in the 
understanding of the human being, with the consequent challenges to the epistemic, 
methodological and ontological orders. This can be contrasted with Galtung’s abstract 
understanding of social health. Galtung draws a parallel between health studies and peace 
studies: both follow a movement that goes from diagnosis, to prognosis, to therapy wherein 
health is understood as peace and violence as disease (1996, p. 1). Galtung refers to systems 
of actors/cells and talks about well-states and ill-states. At the analytical stage, the researcher 
must consider “Nature, Human, Social, World, Time, Culture” (GALTUNG, 1996, p. 1) in 
terms of contexts, conditions and causes. If a well-state becomes an ill-state, the subsequent 
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question is whether the system can restore itself or whether intervention is needed. For 
Galtung, external intervention cannot be considered therapeutic; in contrast, the work of peace 
is to provide the conditions for the inherent capacities of self-restoration. Therefore, therapy is 
to restore the system into its previous well-state. Positive peace is preventive rather than 
curative, it is then the stimulation of the stability of the system that fosters self-restoration 
even in the presence of symptoms of illness. 
Fanon’s concern for social and mental health in colonial societies creates a more 
complicated landscape. For Fanon and Gordon (2006, p. 50), as we understand them, social 
health cannot precede existence. At the outset, Fanon distinguishes society from biochemical 
processes, for the human being is “what brings society into being” (2008, p. 4). Out of this 
sociogenic declaration that links the subjective with the objective, the human as the producer 
of meaning in a world of other humans, Fanon dealt with the paradox that making a black 
person mentally healthy in a racist society would mean to attune her to a sick society. Health, 
being what upholds and legitimates the sick system, led Fanon to question what health means, 
and therefore, to reflect on how to think about it, especially considering that the tools 
available for reflection and practice were colonial in nature. Therefore, neither reflection nor 
practice could be carried out without considering power. Fanon answered those questions, 
firstly, through rejecting the dialectics of recognition. The ethical relations that Galtung 
presupposes are absent in a racist society. The “zone of nonbeing” (FANON, 2008, p. 2), is 
that region where the ethical relations between self and other are not applied to the black 
person, but it is also by thinking from this underside that enables a critical perspective and 
shelters the possibility of a new society. The task envisaged by Fanon is for the black to 
become actional rather than passive or merely reactive (2008, pp. 119, 173), and the goal is 
“to set up institutions permeated by care for human beings” (FANON, 1967, p. 53). 
However, an important aspect of Fanonian thought that Gordon (2015, p. 114) 
highlights, and which is also part of the Africana political experience, is that by being actional 
and expanding the scope of influence and intervention in the world, the very existence of the 
black becomes violence in an anti-black society. Those “illicit appearance[s]” could not afford 
to rely on the ethics of the society to sustain their claims, for relying on what is good would 
imply accepting the legitimacy of the system that keeps them outside.  The task at hand is a 
political one which, etymologically, is the form of dealing with conflict through 
communication rather than war. However, this is a double task for those who are excluded 
from the realm of politics and whose political appearance is seen as violence, for they must do 
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politics with the purpose of creating politics sustained by ethical relationships (GORDON: 
2008, pp. 86-89). In this view, Galtung’s telescopic model of social health, without 
considerations of history, power asymmetries, and assuming the intrinsic legitimacy of the 
society, might lead to maintaining the status quo. 
There are uncomfortable dimensions to the problem which those in power will be 
unwilling to address – unwillingly, ultimately, because they are used to having 
other’s cake and eating it, too –  and one of these dimensions is the legitimation 
crisis […]: the very conditions that they may place upon the praxis of oppressed 
people may ultimately be conditions that will make no difference. (GORDON, 
1995a, p. 78) 
The questions of legitimacy and conditionality that peace studies has decided not to 
ask are the questions emerging from the underside. Fanon was not the only one. From the 
anti-colonial revolution in Haiti to the Civil Rights, Black Consciousness or the current 
movements of Black Lives Matter, or shack dwellers in postapartheid South Africa (GIBSON, 
2011), those struggling for liberation realize that the dialectics of recognition are not 
conducive to change, and could not afford to rely on a priori notions of what they shall do, 
what will function or what will fail. 
Although geopolitical criticism of the intrinsic violence of the liberal peace paradigm 
abound, peace studies seems to assume that by reformulating and rethinking the concept of 
peace, and consequently the approach to reality, the conditions of the oppressed shall be 
different. But among the questions that black liberation movements have been asking is what 
happens if and when peace, justice or human rights are not enough, when they function as 
sentinels of social change for those in power? The paucity of engagement with black 
liberation and anti-colonial movements, except for those of Martin Luther King Jr. and 
Mahatma Ghandi, and the treatment of those movements as a thing of the past, reveals that if 
one does not ask, maybe it is because one does not want to hear the answer. 
Galtung’s initial distinction between positive and negative peace has elicited much 
reflection on alternative conceptualizations of peace, partly because of the vagueness of the 
concept itself. On one side, there have been explorations of the meaning of peace across 
cultures (DIETRICH et al. 2011, FRYE, 2007). On the other side, philosophical and 
interdisciplinary reformulations of the concept of peace have been advanced. Among the latter, 
Francisco Muñoz’s idea of imperfect peace proposes a view of peace as an incomplete, 
imperfect process in which conflict is an integral part. This conception stands in contrast to 
the common view of peace as a static and unachievable ideal. For Muñoz, imperfect peace is 
“a process between negative peace and positive peace, between the absence of violence and 
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the preeminence of justice” (2001, p. 12). For Muñoz, this notion seeks to highlight ordinary 
moments of positivity for peace research epistemology, to recognize peaceful practices amidst 
structural and direct violence, to prepare the terrain for the conflictive and imperfect quality of 
the future, and to overcome the peaceful/violent dualism by looking at intermediate situations. 
Further, he takes peace theorists to task for the lack of attention to power, concretely, 
“peaceful power taking” (MUÑOZ, 2001). 
This is a valuable formulation in terms of the disciplines’ goals. It enables us to 
recognize the complex dynamics of peace and violence, and apparently solves the theodicean 
dimension of peace, wherein violence would be extra-systemic. The problem with that 
perspective is that the theorist presupposes that human beings think in terms of a single 
element – peace – as a way of negotiating their relations, and that they have stable objectives, 
attitudes and choices. But what if those objectives and attitudes are different, or change 
because of their interactions in the social world, or because of historical impositions?  We 
cannot know, basically because as in the case of structural violence above, the theorist 
presents a world without humans. If part of what incompleteness entails is an opening of 
possibilities and directions, one wonders if this avowal of the imperfection of peace is another 
form of asserting the perfection of the new system. In Gordon’s view, by   
admitting the injustice of the system and showing how it could be made good, the 
logic of ultimate goodness is inscribed in the avowed range of the all-enveloping 
alternative system. Such a new system’s rigor requires, in effect, the elimination of 
all outsiders by virtue of their assimilation. (GORDON, 2007, p. 122) 
At the heart of Gordon’s warning against disciplinary decadence does not lie a concern 
for the health of the disciplines for their own sake. Instead, the center of Gordon’s 
preoccupation is the relationship of human beings as knowers and producers of knowledge to 
a broader reality, which as we have seen, exceeds and precedes thought. It is a relation of 
humility and expansion rather than of conquering and reduction. To overcome that, Gordon 
does not propose interdisciplinarity, where untouched disciplines work together while running 
parallel to each other, but a “teleological suspension of disciplinarity” (2006, p.44). To ensure 
the vitality of thought entails the humbling realization that reality is “infinitely bigger than us” 
(Ibid, p. 45). It also requires the maturity to face the challenges and the complexity of human 
reality by taking responsibility for it. The result is an opening to new knowledge interactions 
and relationships that can lead to new and broader disciplines. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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This paper does not suggest an incompatibility between Lewis Gordon or Africana theorists 
and peace studies. On the contrary, it suggests the need to engage other disciplines beyond 
assimilationist approaches and predetermined outcomes. The vitality of thought requires 
dialogue and, therefore, listening. Dialogue is an important dimension in the theory and praxis 
of peace studies. However, Gordon emphasizes the difference between listening and admitting 
what is being listened to. The latter can entail questioning the listener’s own assumptions 
through which the transformation of meanings, values and relationships can begin. As human 
beings are fundamentally relational and open possibilities, supporting freedom of thought also 
requires that disciplines relate in such a way, as sites of transdisciplinary communication and 
creation for the actual purpose of thinking, which is meant to serve all humans facing 
challenges and conflicts.   
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